Exceptionalism

    I have been trying to understand the idea of (American) exceptionalism.  My understanding is that it originates from the idea that our society was different from all prior ones, and that our society was the exception of the historical norm of the people being oppressed by their rulers (rulers who had always established governments for the benefit of the rulers rather than the ruled, our government being viewed as the exception to this as well).  It seems that now many in our foreign policy circles understand it to mean (or at least use it to mean) that our society is allowed exceptions to the rules it prescribes to others (exception as in we get a pass from adhering to the rules we prescribe for everyone else, for example, while we declare the rule that the sovereignty of nations must be respected and is inviolable, we are allowed to violate another’s sovereignty, and this is okay because we are the “exceptional” nation).  Perhaps the two are related, because since we see our selves as historically special, we should therefore view ourselves as deserving of special privileges under any norms or rules set forth.   Perhaps what we mean is that we view ourselves as especially brave, visionary, innovative, tenacious, and so on, and that therefore our superiority gives us special rights and privilege (an argument likely to be unconvincing to others, and also likely to make them dislike us rather than like us as it is hard to not take such an idea as arrogant and condescending).  

• What is meant by exceptional (in the context of foreign relations)? 

     I’ve been trying to understand this idea, because it seems to be used as the argument (at least the publicly facing argument) as to why we should dominate other societies, why we get to determine for everyone else what actions are an are not allowable.  Those who make the argument seem to play on the confusion mentioned in the section above about whether exceptionalism means that we are the exception to historical norms or rather that we get exceptions to following currently recognized precedents (i.e. the informal rules of broader, or even global, society).  In some ways there is a logical linkage: if we are the exception to historical norms, and this is a good thing, then shouldn’t we get an exception from following current norms, assuming by extension that this also would be a good thing?  The question is perhaps twofold: 1. should the norms of the past have been overturned?, and 2. should the norms (rules) of today be overturned?  Answering yes to the first question does not mean that the answer to the second question must also be yes, nor does it specify which norms of today are worth overturning versus which may still be just and valid.  Further, simply because we might have done well in the past does not mean we are guaranteed to do well in the future, nor that therefore we can overturn any and all norms if needed as result (even without first distinguishing which may be in need of revision and which may still be justifiable).  

• Is our history of progress grant us license to further defy norms?  [This assumes our prior defiance of norms have resulted in progress, which not all would agree with.]

     In order to better understand the argument made by those who view us as “exceptional”, I’ve been trying to read arguments for such, and so read (the majority, but not all of) the 2015 book “Exceptional” by Dick and Liz Cheney.  For me, the most cogent argument of that book comes down to a question of realism versus idealism.  The section on our relationship with another nation seems most clearly to address this question, particularly the passage below (from page 196):

In this new world, governed by an idealized “international system” Obama explained, “rules must be binding, violations must be punished, and words must mean something.”  Obama’s vision was simultaneously prescriptive and passive – these things all “must” happen, yet there is no mention of who will make them happen.  …  There was no recognition, and worse, no apparent understanding, that the triumph of freedom was the result of actions of free nations – especially the United States.  …  The president’s failure to understand this fundamental truth – that freedom must be defended and America must lead that defense – has been the fatal flaw in his policies.

To the last sentence “that freedom must be defended” I would insert the inferred addition below to reflect the broader context of the entire section, so that it reads: that freedom must be defended (by someone, and not assuming it will just happen; defended at times with force, and a force which is capable of effective protection and prepared to respond when needed).

• An excerpt from an argument for our exceptionalism; essentially an argument for realism rather than solely idealism.

    To me, this argument is a fair critique.  It might not be right that someone _________, but they might do it anyways, and if I view myself as living in an idealistic and idyllic world where such actions will not take place, I may not have taken any preparations or precautions to avoid such an event from happening, nor have any meaningful way to remedy the situation afterwards.   It is a realistic view of the world that some people will do things that we think are bad, and that the only thing that will restrain some of these people is force or plausible belief of forthcoming force.  Failure to accept this reality and to prepare for it leaves us in a position where we end up as powerless victims [recipients] sputtering idealistic principles while being violently trounced, (and possibly violently destroyed as well).  If no one will take action to stand against harm and to stop it, then in many instances, the harm will not be stopped.  We cannot simply wish for things to happen (or not happen), nor rely on rationalizations of why such actions are not logically and morally justifiable to prevent them from happening, nor pretend that we have achieved a utopian world in which crass violence and naked injustice will never happen again.  If someone (some people, groups, etc) is not capable of stopping these things, then when they arise, they may visit themselves upon us without hindrance.  And perhaps we are the only nation that is strong enough to perform this role, and to marshal others to the work that needs to be done (conventional history would seem to indicate this to be at least a somewhat fair assessment of the present).  Some people have to do this work, and some leadership, or at least cohering principles that unifies the organization or group working towards these efforts, must exist.  This does not make us “exceptional” per se, though perhaps you could argue that by being willing and able to be that force that is prepared and capable of protecting freedom, as well as have at least some concept of the value of doing so, that combination makes us unique amongst other nations.  The argument for the consideration of reality made by the authors seems convincing to me, as well the need for someone to step up to help in times of danger (not just assuming it will happen).

• Realism has its validity, to ignore it risks foreseeable harms to ourselves.  We need to recognize that some will take and harm because they can, and will only be stopped by force.

    While I think the critique is fair, in it I also see the adage to the effect that you often end up becoming the evil you set out to destroy.  While it is fair to have a realist view of the world, it cannot entirely exclude idealism (i.e. some hope for a better future) as doing so seems likely to lead down of path saying that since others will act with impunity, I must be prepared to defend against it with equal or greater measures, and that therefore I must be prepared to be as ruthless or more ruthless than those who might harm me (and not giving others reasonable benefit of doubt or allowing the possibility that they may not be as evil as they seem).  To me, when this becomes the overwhelming mindset, fear is used to justify actions of a preemptory nature (and thus we risk ourselves being the provocateur and instigator of violence when in reality no violence from the other party may have actually have been forthcoming).  Further, it also seems to tend to corrode remaining ideals by the constant “realistic” (i.e. pessimistic) view of the world in which violence is the only definitive and reliable solution, and which in combination with the temptation of gain combined with the belief that our group now has superior power such we ourselves can use harsh and unjustifiable methods without fear of retribution, it serves to further corrode our ideals and makes us more likely to become the evil we claim to seek to defeat.

• Realism alone seems insufficient, and seems to tend to corrode our ideals such that we risk becoming the evil we set out to destroy. 

    In talking about what they view as the forces of evil that we should fight against, the authors state (page 205) “They [tyrannical regimes] arm themselves, mass their forces, capture territory, and seize their chance to dominate as much of the globe as possible with their tyrannical rule.”  While the authors are referring to other regimes as taking these actions, the concern that many of us have now is that we (the USA) take these same actions (indeed the authors repeatedly call for taking such actions throughout the book, repeatedly calling for more arms for our country, for more force projection capabilities, to occupy and/or hold more foreign territory, and to maintain our global power as much as possible).   It seems likely that other societies around the world, rather than seeing our actions as necessary to spread and defend freedom, perhaps view us as the tyrants that we claim to be fighting to overcome.  One other relevant mention is made of this by quoting President Reagan (page 31) who, speaking on the 40th anniversary of D Day, says US soldiers had a faith that what they were fighting for was right because “there is a profound moral difference between the use of force for liberation and the use of force for conquest“.  I think most would agree with this sentiment.  The challenge seems to be that this clear distinction has been lost, and it is not clear to ourselves and to others around the world that all our post World War II conflicts have been simply benevolent actions of liberation rather than simply self serving actions of conquest.  This is further blurred by the reasonable expectation that, even if we are liberating others from oppression, it is not unreasonable for us to expect some recompense for our troubles, and it is reasonable for the people who have been saved to feel gratitude and genuinely desire to repay our kindness.  While these motives seem justifiable and fair, they also blur the distinction between conquest and liberation, since the line between the unprompted gratitude of a saved society and the historical required tribute of conquered nations is not always clear to an observer.  To at least some in the world and at home, our actions sometimes look more like the latter than the former.

• How do we distinguish ourselves from the evil we claim to be fighting when we seem, at least to some, to be using the same methods and seeking the same results?  

    There is also inherent to the prior discussion the question of perception versus reality.  Perhaps sometimes someone is genuinely acting in good faith to help someone else without any expectation of return, and sometimes someone is unrepentantly harming others for gain (and likely in most instances the truth is somewhere in between, with some of both motivations influencing actions).  However, the true charitable liberation action may be misconstrued or misrepresented by others as conquest, and conquest may be misunderstood or portrayed by the conqueror as charitable liberation and assistance.  For most of us, we have little chance of being able to make an accurate assessment of which was the actual primary motivation of the action, and cannot meaningfully collect enough information on the realities of the actions that actually occurred to make a meaningfully informed decision.  We are therefore left to to make judgement we can based on perceptions of the events as told by others, and so in essence we are trusting them to provide us with an accurate, unbiased, and broad perspective of what transpired.  From a realist perspective, how we are viewed (which is based on our ability to have narratives that are trusted, and therefore relies on establishing credibility) is all that matters.  For idealists, the reality of the events are that matter, as they have confidence that the truth will ultimately be revealed and prevail.  Like much of the above, it is likely some of both.  At some point, reality must intrude, and if it does not generally match the perceptions that been given prior to then, it will cause a backlash against all the narratives that the source has previously told.  Perception must seemingly generally have some link to reality, and so therefore both perception and reality are relevant to informing others’ view of whether they see us as benevolent defenders or rapacious conquerers.  This judgement by others, whether they form it on perception or reality, is important, for a negative judgement will consign both good and bad societies alike to hardship, 

• Perception versus reality; judgements of others matter, and likely reflect some reality and some perception.  Reality cannot be allowed to completely separate from perception or else all credibility can be lost. 

We also risk the fracturing of our coalition and values at home while working to expand them and export them abroad.  

[The internal versus external considerations of such actions.]

[The arrogance with which we may be perceived by the world, and how this harms us.]

[The concept that while it is better to be feared than loved, care must be taken to not become despised.  Relatedly that when people fear inaction of not resisting more than the action of resisting, there will be a strong motivation for it.]

[Even if the realist argument that force will always be needed is correct, it does not follow that we are the ones who have been elevated to the position of determining when and where that force should be applied, or doing so without consultation of others.  It seems unlikely that we are the only ones capable of doing this, and that others aren’t capable of taking some action in this regard or figuring out how to work together to do so.]

• Some additional considerations for further review.

    Fundamentally, this is a question of who has a right to rule over others, and what lengths they may got to or what means they might use to enforce and secure their rule.  I’m not an anarchist, I don’t think it works in reality, theory, principle, or practice.  As a result (and, if you also don’t believe in anarchy, by default it must be such) there must be some leadership or ruler, some thing, person, people, institution, framework, norm, etc that governs and rules (even in the most passive case, even if it is not so much an active choice but rather something that results by natural default and happenstance, such leadership and rule still seemingly must exist).  Determining who and what this is, in what contexts it governs and has authority, and for how long, what should be done when issues arise, seems to be the underlying fundamental question (one which I’m sure no one has ever thought of before, and that can probably be easily answered in a paragraph or two).  While I cannot answer that longstanding question, it is worth perhaps pointing out that we claim to be spreading “democracy”, yet the people we are spreading it to did not vote for it to come to them, nor do they have any vote in the rules that we might impose upon them as a result.  As a result of this very obvious contradiction, it seems likely that our credibility will continue to be undercut, and that more will view us as conquerers rather than liberators, more a force of tyranny rather than freedom.  We must be able to establish coherent and credible principles and rationalizations for any rulership (based on the fundamental concepts of rights to rule from the extensive works of political philosophy and history, as well as prevailing social opinions), and then use this to guide our actions and in our diplomacy (narratives, representations, perceptions we give out) with (to) our neighbors, peers, and society in general.

• Our actions must based on sound and recognizable principles that put our credibility and diplomatic relations on a good footing.
• We want to improve and be better, yet we can do nothing if we do not at least try.  Let us try.